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THE QUEST FOR UNIFORMITY IN
MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY:
FOOLISH CONSISTENCY OR CRUCIAL
PREDICTABILITY?
ELLEN E. DEASON'
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost everyone has heard someone proclaim that "consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds."2 Those more familiar with the quote can
retort that it is only "foolish consistency" that Emerson condemned with
his memorable phrase.' There certainly is little consistency, foolish or
otherwise, in the current laws, rules and judicial practices that govern
confidentiality in mediation. Experimentation by the states has led to a
rich, but conflicting, variety of approaches.4 By adopting the Uniform
Mediation Act (UMA), the states would greatly advance predictability
through a coordinated approach to confidentiality. This goal is anything
but foolish. In fact, it is crucial to the continued development of
mediation as an effective mode of dispute resolution. Further, to the
extent that a state's current confidentiality rules differ from the balance
struck in the UMA, the importance of a predictable system nationwide
should outweigh a single state's investment in its previous policy
choices. I read Professor Hughes to argue that we did not need
uniformity and, even if we did, the UMA offers too much protection
against disclosure In my view, he is mistaken on both counts.
1. Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. Professor Deason served
as an advisor to the Uniform Mediation Act Drafting Committees on mediation
confidentiality in the federal court system. This article benefited from comments by Nancy
Rogers, Richard Reuben and Marc Hilber, who also provided excellent research assistance.
This project was supported by a summer grant from the University of Illinois College of Law.
2. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in SELF-RELIANCE AND OTHER ESSAYS
19, 24 (Dover Thrift ed., Dover Pub. 1993) (1841).
3. Id.
4. See infra Part III.B.1.
5. This article was prepared in response to Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation
Act To The Spoiled Go The Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 9 (2001) [hereinafter Hughes
Article].
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
Confidentiality for mediation communications is regarded as
fundamental to effective mediation. This judgment is reflected in the
strong scholarly support for mediation confidentiality' and in the
statutes passed in every state to protect communications from
disclosure Strong confidentiality protection is, in many instances,
crucial to establishing working relationships within the mediation
framework between the adversary parties and with the mediator.
First, confidentiality fosters communication between the parties and
the mediator. It can make an agreement possible even when one cannot
be reached in ordinary negotiation. Improving communication is also
the goal in other settings, such as consultations, where the legal system
protects the privacy of relationships by granting a privilege from
discovery and testimony between attorney and client, doctor and
patient, and priest and penitent.8 Forthright communication is even
6. Many scholars endorse privilege as the most effective method for protecting
mediation confidentiality. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff,
Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37
(1986); Eileen Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor Disputes, 11
CAP. U. L. REV. 181 (1981); Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediation Confidentiality Rule,
12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17 (1988); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from
Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation
Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (1995); Michael
Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 1 (1988). Additional scholars agree that confidentiality is important, but favor
means other than privilege for its protection. See, e.g., Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality,
Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L
REV. 91 (1999) (arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 provides adequate confidentiality
protection for mediation); Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 2 (1986) (recognizing that confidentiality is "important, necessary,
and appropriate" in "core cases" but arguing that a privilege is unnecessary to protect
confidentiality); Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent Encouraging
Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 315
(1989) (proposing a rule that a neutral shall not disclose or testify concerning settlements).
But see Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look-The Case for a Mediation Privilege Has Not Been
Made, 5 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. Winter 1998, at 14 (arguing that "it is important to remember
that no empirical data exists that connects the success of mediation with the availability of a
confidentiality privilege").
7. See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE app. A (2d ed. 1994) (SARAH R. COLE ed., Supp. 1998); Pamela A. Kentra, Hear
No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between
the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney
Misconduct, 1997 BYU. L. REV. 715, 733, app. at 757 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
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more challenging in mediation than in these other settings, however,
because relationships in mediation are multiple and complex. An
attorney, doctor, or priest is consulted as a trusted figure who will act or
provide advice in the party's best interest. In this context,
confidentiality enhances the freedom to communicate, enabling this
trusted figure to gather the information necessary and to advise the
party accordingly, without the client, patient, or penitent fearing that
those communications might be turned against him in a legal
proceeding.9 Within mediation, in contrast, the initial level of trust is far
lower. The goal in mediation is effective communication with an
adversarial party. The role of the mediator herself-to facilitate direct
communications and serve as an intermediary for indirect
communications-is evidence of the difficulty of this goal. Moreover,
even the mediator is not a trusted counselor, but merely a neutral.
Ideally, parties will trust the mediator because of her neutral role, but
they cannot expect her to act wholly in the interests of any one of them.
A fundamental part of the difficulty in communicating with an
adversary is the threat of disclosure to one's disadvantage. This threat
has more facets in mediation than in other protected settings. In an
attorney-client consultation, for example, disclosures typically do not
originate from either of the pair who exchanges information. 0 Instead,
the privilege functions to prevent an outside adversary from compelling
the attorney or client to reveal their communications. In mediation,
however, the adversary with whom the exchange needs to take place is
also a major source of potential disclosures. If a lawsuit is a possibility,
or especially if one is already underway, much that might be said in a
good faith attempt to reach settlement during a mediation could become
an admission against interest in the courtroom in the absence of
confidentiality protections. It would be unrealistic to trust that the
opposing party would refrain from using these communications to its
litigation advantage." Even without a lawsuit, by the time disputing
parties reach mediation, their relationship often has degenerated into
administration of justice").
9. See 1d.
10. One exception is in a dispute over fees or malpractice, where MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr R. 1.6 (2001) permits a lawyer to reveal confidential information
"to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary" to establish a claim or defense in a
controversy with a client.
11. See, e.g., Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Conneliy Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d
Cir. 1979) (explaining that without confidentiality, mediation participants "of necessity will
feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner
more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game").
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animosity and distrust. Therefore, in many mediations, confidentiality
does far more than merely enhance the candid nature of the discussion;
between some adversaries, confidentiality may be akin to a precondition
for any discussion.
Because mediation involves communications with an adversary, the
legal structures that promote confidentiality must do more than function
as a restraint on outside parties who seek disclosure; they must also
provide a substitute for trust between those who are communicating.
This is accomplished by limiting the adverse party's ability to disclose or
make use of mediation communications. In this respect, assurances of
confidentiality reduce the chilling potential of disclosures, whether
initiated from inside or outside the group of mediation participants.
Parties are then free to explore possibilities for a resolution to their
dispute without worrying about the consequences in the courtroom if
their exploration does not succeed."
Second, confidentiality is important for maintaining the neutrality of
the mediator. As cogently expressed in NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso,
Inc.,13 a mediator who testifies will inevitably be seen as acting contrary
to the interests of one of the parties, which necessarily destroys her
neutrality. It is true that this departure from neutrality is not personal
or intentional when a mediator is compelled to testify under subpoena.
Nonetheless, if a mediator can be converted into the opposing party's
weapon in court, then her neutrality is only temporary and illusory.
Neutrality is a bedrock principle of mediation that provides the basis
for an effective working relationship between a mediator and parties to
a mediation.4 In mediations that use caucuses, one of the keys to
reaching an agreement is often information that the parties convey to
the mediator even though they do not want it disclosed to the other side.
12. The possibility of disclosure outside the courtroom may also have a chilling effect on
communication in mediation. The UMA leaves this aspect of confidentiality to the parties
because, unlike discovery or court testimony, it can be managed effectively through
agreement. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
(NCCUSL), DRAFr UNIFORM MEDIATION ACr WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND REPORTER'S
NOTES §2(1) (May 2001) [hereinafter MAY 2001 DRAFT]. All citations to the MAY 2001
DRAFt will be followed by sections in brackets that reference the final version of the UMA
[hereinafter UMA] that is printed in full in the pages that follow within this edition of the
Marquette Law Review. There will not, however, be corresponding sections to the Prefatory
Note or Reporter's Notes because these portions of the final UMA were not completed at the
time of publication.
13. 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1980).
14. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 837 (1999)
(describing neutrality as "a primary value of mediation").
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When a mediator must reveal this information in court, it harms the
functioning of the mediation process by undermining future parties'
expectations of mediator neutrality.'
Third, when a dispute in mediation is also the subject of a lawsuit,
confidentiality provisions perform an important role by keeping the
judging function separate from the mediation function. This separation
is especially important for court-annexed mediation programs or
referrals from other decision-making bodies, because the referral links
these functions more closely than when a privately mediated dispute is
later litigated. Without assurances of confidentiality between court
mediators and judges or arbitrators, parties may fear that their
conversations with the mediator could be conveyed informally to the
decision-maker. This fear of backdoor disclosures could be quite
chilling for mediation, notwithstanding limitations on introducing
mediation information as evidence in a lawsuit. 6 The problem is
especially great if the parties face the prospect of a bench trial in the
event that they fail to settle the case.
Moreover, confidentiality between mediators and judges helps
protect the integrity of both processes. As with other ex parte
communications, communications between a mediator and the assigned
judge cast doubt on the judge's decision-making neutrality.17 Such
communications can also raise questions about the independence of the
mediator from judicial influences. When courts provide mediation, and
especially when they mandate mediation, they need to carefully prevent
improper cross-communication if they are to avoid the appearance of
bias on the part of the judge or mediator."'
In sum, the challenge of communicating with an adversary, the
presence of a neutral intermediary, and the potential for information
15. See, e.g., Marchal v. Craig, 681 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that
the court rule preventing mediator testimony protects the mediation process itself).
16. Cf Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, 6 DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at
11 (noting the problem of a perceived information leakage from a mediating judge to the
judge who will try the case).
17. Consequently, both state and federal codes of judicial ethics prohibit ex parte
communications. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7) (1990); CODE
OF CONDUCr FOR FEDERAL JUDGES Canon 3(A)(3), 175 F.R.D. 364,367 (1998).
18. See, eg., Township of Aberdeen v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Assoc., Local 163, 669
A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (vacating the arbitration award where the
arbitrator impermissibly relied on information presented during mediation but not at the
arbitral hearing). But see Fenske v. Fenske, No. C4-99-2007, 2000 WL 622589 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 16, 2000) (approving trial court's use of a mediator as a court-appointed expert
witness who made recommendations following an unsuccessful mediation). Cf. Sander, supra
note 16 (discussing appearance of impropriety created by judicial mediation).
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informally reaching a judge all make confidentiality especially important
for mediation. Each of these aspects of mediation also carries its own
implications for how confidentiality protections need to be structured.
While many state statutory provisions and court rules are focused
primarily on one or two of these purposes for confidentiality, the UMA
manages to advance them all. The privilege held by each of the parties
allows them to control the conditions under which they communicate
with the opposing side.'9 The privilege held by the mediator allows her
to protect the process by maintaining her neutrality. 20  And the
prohibition against a mediator disclosing communications to a court
maintains the separation and integrity of both mediation and judicial
decision-making.2  These legal measures can increase parties'
confidence that mediation will not harm their interests and thus will be
effective in encouraging their meaningful participation.
III. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
Valuing confidentiality is one thing, but promoting uniformity in
confidentiality laws is altogether another. Consistency would certainly
be foolish if the sole purpose for aligning the legal structures that govern
confidentiality was to promote uniformity for its own sake. That,
however, is far from the case. In mediation, as in other settings in which
privileges encourage communications, protection for those
communications must be predictable if confidentiality is to have its
intended effect.22  To optimize communication among mediation
participants and provide a foundation for their perception of the
mediator's (and when applicable, the court's) neutrality, the benefits of
confidentiality must be effective ex ante, during the mediation process,
and prior to any dispute over the scope of confidentiality. The positive
influence of confidentiality is lost if, during the mediation, the parties
and their lawyers do not have confidence in their ability to protect
19. MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 12, § 5(b)(1); [UMA § 4(b)(1)].
20. Id. § 5(b)(2)-(3); [UMA § 4(b)(2)-(3)].
21. Id. § 8(a)-(c); [UMA § 7 (a)-(c)].
22. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all.
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communications from future disclosure and in the system's protection
for mediator and judicial neutrality.
Such confidence would be easy to build if mediation occurred in a
locked box that could be sealed at the end of the process. This isolation,
however, is unrealistic for mediation-there are too many other values
that compete with confidentiality for this one principle to control
without exception. Confidentiality not only runs counter to the general
value we place on hearing all the evidence in our adversarial system of
justice,' but it also can impair specific goals important to society.24 As a
result, confidentiality cannot be absolutely protected, and there will
inevitably be some level of uncertainty associated with mediation
communications. In this climate, it is not useful to regard confidentiality
as an "all or nothing" proposition. Mediation participants need to
develop more nuanced expectations about circumstances that may
trigger the need for disclosure. An adequate level of predictability
requires, at a minimum, knowledge of the boundaries at which
uncertainty begins for confidentiality.
Predictability is not, of course, the same as uniformity. Indeed,
uniformity is not necessary for predictability if one can know that
certain conditions will lead inevitably to a particular result, and can then
control those conditions. This would mean knowing what law of
confidentiality will govern a suit filed in a chosen forum and ensuring
that confidentiality disputes are in fact resolved in that forum.
Unfortunately, as discussed below, there are so many variables involved
in determining confidentiality protection that a high level of
predictability is unrealistic. First, parties have only a limited ability to
control the forum in which their mediation communications may
become a relevant issue. Second, parties also have only a limited ability
to control the law that will apply to a confidentiality dispute. Knowing
the characteristics of the applicable law is important not only because of
the many variations among the states, but also because the ambiguities
in many current statutes introduce uncertainty to their application.
This multi-faceted lack of control is nothing new. It is embedded in
our multi-jurisdictional dual court system and complex choice-of-law
rules. The importance of where suit is filed and what law will determine
the level of confidentiality loses its force, however, if all the options for
23. See e.g., JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192,
at 70 (1961) (stating court is entitled to "every [person's] evidence").
24. Some exceptions to accommodate specific goals that require disclosures are
discussed infra at note 45.
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courts and applicable law lead to identical limits on disclosures. Thus,
uniform mediation rules will be the most reliable way (and perhaps the
only realistic way) to improve predictability for mediation
confidentiality.
A. Flexibility of Forum
The first step in determining what law would be applied in a litigated
confidentiality dispute is to determine the likely forum. It is difficult to
foresee, at the time of a mediation, that a dispute will arise and threaten
confidentiality, let alone to forecast the circumstances that will
determine the forum options for that dispute. Forum prediction is most
certain, however, when suit is filed prior to mediation and the mediation
either terminates without an agreement or results in a disagreement
about a purported settlement agreement. In these specific situations,
the already-established ongoing litigation forum is the typical location
for resolving confidentiality disputes that may follow.2'
The forum for a confidentiality dispute is much harder to predict
when mediation of a filed case is successful or when the case otherwise
terminates before a dispute arises. Courts rarely retain jurisdiction over
a completed case unless they need to monitor the implementation of a
settlement agreement. Frequently, a later dispute between mediation
parties that triggers a lawsuit may be brought in any court that meets
jurisdiction and venue requirements. The filing party has this flexibility
even if the suit raises confidentiality issues about a mediation held under
the auspices and rules of a different court. Therefore, it is inaccurate to
assume that the court that sponsored a court-annexed mediation will
also decide any subsequent confidentiality dispute linked to that
mediation. There may be a geographical shift,26 a shift from state to
25. See, e.g., Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing breach of
confidentiality in court's mediation program); Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Neb.
1997) (rejecting claim of confidentiality for mediation settlement proposals in order to decide
motion for sanctions arising out of court's mediation program); Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc.,
901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (sanctioning attorney for violation of confidentiality
provisions of court's mediation program and referral order); In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C.
1990) (disciplining attorney for conflict of interest revealed in court-ordered mediation);
Paranzino v. Barnett Bank, 690 So.2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (sanctioning plaintiff for
breach of confidentiality provisions following court-ordered mediation); Few v. Hammack
Enter., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (considering evidence from mediation to
conclude that parties reached an agreement in a court-sponsored mediation program).
26. See, e.g., Datapoint Corp. v. Picturetel Corp., No. CIV.A.3:93-CV-2381D, 1998 WL
25536 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 1998) (deciding challenge to a settlement reached in a related case
in the Southern District of Texas mediation program).
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federal court,' or a shift from federal to state court.2 If statements from
the parties' mediation are relevant to their later suit, then a court other
than the one that sponsored the mediation may well make the
confidentiality decision.
In mediations that take place without a lawsuit in the background
the parties face even more uncertainty regarding potential forums in the
event of a later dispute. If a mediation occurs between citizens of the
same state who raise only issues subject to state law, then the parties
may be fairly safe in predicting that if a suit follows their mediation, it
will likely take place in state court in their home state. With respect to a
mediation between citizens of different states or a mediation on a topic
that could develop into a federal claim, however, confidentiality may
become an issue in either federal or state court. Additionally, a
mediation between citizens of different states or a mediation with a
multi-state component could spawn a lawsuit located in any one of
multiple forums.9
Moreover, parties in any mediation must consider the possibility that
someone who is not participating in their mediation may bring a lawsuit
and seek discovery or testimony concerning their mediation
communications.' This creates even greater uncertainty in predicting
possible forums, as the filing decision is often not in the hands of either
party. Parties do have the option to reduce their forum uncertainty by
entering into a private agreement that designates their choice of judicial
forum in the event that a dispute arises out of the mediation. The force
of such agreements, however, is uncertain and they certainly are not
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (quashing subpoena to
mediator to testify regarding state court mediation); Hudgins v. Security Bank of Whitesboro,
188 B.R. 938 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (determining validity of a settlement agreement from
state court mediation).
28. See, e.g., Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949-50 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (remanding to
state court to hear counterclaim on breach of mediation settlement agreement allegedly
coerced by mediator).
29. See, eg., Asten, Inc. v. Wangner Sys. Corp., No. C.A. 15617, 1999 WL 803965 (Del
Ch. Sept. 23, 1999) (considering validity of agreement reached in Florida mediation to settle
federal claims in patent litigation in South Carolina between two Delaware corporations with
principal places of business in South Carolina).
30. See e.g., Sheldone v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511 (W.D. Pa.
2000) (plaintiffs sought discovery regarding mediation held on potential claims); Folb v.
Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd,
216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff sought discovery regarding mediation on claims that
were never filed); In re March, 1994 Special Grand Jury, 897 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D. Ind. 1995)
(federal prosecutors sought information for criminal prosecution from mediation held under
auspices of state court).
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likely to be effective against a stranger to the mediation."
In short, for many mediations, the level of complexity is such that it
is hard to predict the location of a suit that might be filed if a
confidentiality dispute arises after settlement. Such a prediction would
require knowing the nature of the dispute and hence whether federal
subject matter jurisdiction would be satisfied, plus the geographical
limitations imposed by personal jurisdiction and venue requirements.
Furthermore, even if the parties could foresee such details, in all but the
simplest disputes these factors might well permit numerous forum
choices.
Given the wide variation in the confidentiality provisions currently
in force, forum choice by itself can generate uncertainty in applicable
law. Only about half the states have enacted a generally applicable
mediation confidentiality provision.32  The rest of the states have
confidentiality provisions only for mediations concerning specific
subjects or in specific settings, such as court-annexed programs. In these
states, mediations that are not covered under a narrow subject matter
statute typically have no confidentiality protection beyond a relatively
weak evidentiary exclusion for certain aspects of negotiation.3
Furthermore, among states with generally applicable mediation
provisions, statutes are extremely variable. They employ legal
frameworks that include privilege, evidentiary exclusion, or testimonial
incapacity, as well as combinations that do not fit well into any
category.' Exceptions to confidentiality are equally variable. 5 With so
many possibilities, forum choice by itself makes statutory coverage hard
to foresee. Forum uncertainty, however, is only the beginning of the
predictive analysis. The question of applicable law and interpretive
issues concerning that law add additional levels of uncertainty to any
31. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 7, § 9:24.
32. See MAY 2001 DRAFt, supra note 12, at Prefatory Note § 3 (citing twenty-four
statutes).
33. This evidentiary exclusion is provided in many states by a state-law version of
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 408. The scope of these evidentiary exclusions is narrower
than the confidentiality protections provided by a typical mediation statute. See, e.g., In re
Bidwell, 21 P.3d 161 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that admission of letters offered to support
prevailing party's application for attorneys fees was not barred by Oregon Evidence Code
408, but they were protected as confidential mediation communications). The benefits and
limitations of FRE 408 as the primary vehicle for ensuring mediation confidentiality are
summarized in Ehrhardt, supra note 6, at 102-08 and Kirtley, supra note 6, at 11-14.
34. See generally Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S.
Federal System, (forthcoming).
35. See Kirtley, supra note 6, at 39-52.
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attempt to predict the confidentiality of mediation communications.
B. Factors Creating Uncertainty Concerning Applicable Law
Assume that the parties to a mediation can gaze into a crystal ball
and foresee the form and forum of a subsequent lawsuit in which their
mediation communications may be relevant. This section explores why,
even if parties were armed with this knowledge, it would be hard to
predict the outcome of a confidentiality dispute. First, interpretive
questions abound because the law of mediation confidentiality is still so
young and in flux. The existence of a wide variety of legislative
approaches has contributed to interpretive answers that could charitably
be termed "flexible," especially when a court is applying the unfamiliar
law of another forum. Due to ambiguities and gaps in coverage, many
of the current "first generation" mediation statutes would benefit from
an overhaul. Second, interpretation aside, in many circumstances,
identifying the applicable confidentiality law that the court will need to
interpret is itself the threshold issue, is itself uncertain. The UMA
would ameliorate both problems and, by reducing the need to consider
these uncertainties, would greatly enhance predictability in mediation
confidentiality.
1. Uncertainty in Interpretation
Ambiguous legal frameworks for confidentiality protection in some
state statutes have led to confusion, unanticipated court decisions, and
thus poor predictability. For example, many state statutes do not define
mediation or set criteria for when the statute applies' 6 which may leave
parties unsure whether or not their discussion will be classified as
mediation and included under the statute's protections. In addition,
unusual or poorly drafted requirements for coverage can run counter to
parties' expectations or be used in an attempt to avoid confidentiality
obligationsY Carefully crafted limits on scope are also necessary to
36. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452
(Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
48.109 (Michie 1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11
(1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (Michie Supp. 2001). Among states that do define
mediation, there is certainly no consensus. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C
(West 2000) (defining mediation to require a written agreement with a mediator who has
thirty hours of training, four years of experience, or is accountable to a mediation agency
appointed by a court or agency, or that has existed for three years), with NEB. REV. STAT. §
25-2903(6) (1995) (defining mediation as "intervention into a dispute by a third party who has
no decisionmaking authority and is impartial to the issues being discussed").
37. Se4 e.g., Wilmington Hospitality, L.L.C. v. New Castle County, Civ. A. No. 18436,
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perform an exclusionary function-preventing parties to a lawsuit from
cloaking other interactions with a mantle of mediation confidentiality
that may not be justified on public policy grounds." The UMA would
provide a simple but consistent framework to guide parties'
expectations.39
A surprising number of state statutes are ambiguous about the legal
form of their confidentiality protection. They frequently provide no
label.4' They often combine and mix confidentiality doctrines.' They
may confusingly identify their confidentiality protection as one legal
construct, but then incorporate language that arguably creates other
legal forms of protection.42 When a privilege is created in this fashion,
there is no designated holder, a problem that also plagues statutes that
even explicitly establish a privilege.43 The designation of holders is
2001 WL 291948, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2001) (rejecting the argument that court-referred
mediation is not covered by confidentiality rules because parties failed to comply with the
requirement for a written agreement to mediate); cf Fields-D'Arpino v. Restaurant Assoc.,
Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (disqualifying a lawyer from representing party after
determining that he conducted mediation in the dispute).
38. See, e.g., White v. Holton, No. 927915E, 1993 WL 818800 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 4,
1993) (determining that conflict management consultant's report was not protected within
state's statutory definition of mediation); Anderson v. Anderson, 514 S.E.2d 369 (Va. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that mediation confidentiality provisions did not apply when
psychologist functioned as therapist, not mediator).
39. See MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 12, §§ 3(2)-(4), 4; [UMA § 2(1)-(3), 3].
40. See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 78-31b-8 (2001) (providing that mediation participants and
neutral may not disclose and may not be required to disclose mediation communications).
41. The Texas alternative dispute resolution statute, for example, can be read to contain
a privilege held by the parties, an evidentiary exclusion, and immunity from service of
process. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.053(c), 154.073(a) (Vernon 1997).
42. See, e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, 1235
(D. Minn. 1996) (stating that "it is unclear whether [the Minnesota statute] creates a privilege
or a rule of competency"), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999); Peter N.
Thompson, Confidentiality, Competency and Confusion: The Uncertain Promise of the
Mediation Privilege in Minnesota, 18 HAMLINE. J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 329,335 (1997) (arguing
that MINN. STAT. § 595.01(1)(1) (2000) establishes a mediation privilege even though it is
framed in terms of competency); Daniel R. Conrad, Confidentiality Protection in Mediation:
Methods and Potential Problems in North Dakota, 74 N.D. L. REV. 45, 56 (1998) (observing
lack of clarity in North Dakota mediation statute, which may create a rule of privilege or of
inadmissibility).
43. See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805 (West 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5949 (West 2000). Moreover, there is great inconsistency among the statutes that
designate holders. Some designate the parties to the mediation as the holders. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(1) (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West
Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (Michie Supp. 2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.053(c) (Vernon 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070(1)(a) (West
1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(b) (Michie 1999) (mediator may claim privilege only on
behalf of party). Others make the mediator an independent holder. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
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important because it defines the purposes that the privilege serves: a
privilege held by the parties allows them to protect their expectations of
confidentiality; one held by the mediator furthers mediator neutrality."
More fundamentally, while a mixture of multiple confidentiality
doctrines may seem like a harmless abundance of caution, the resulting
lack of clarity can have unintended consequences. For example,
California's mediation confidentiality provisions are contained in
sections of the state evidence code on evidentiary exclusions and witness
competency, but waiver provisions arguably make the evidentiary
exclusion operate as the equivalent of a privilege that can be invoked at
a participant's behest." This sort of ambiguity creates leeway in
characterizing confidentiality protections and in interpreting them. In
fact, both state and federal courts in California have crafted exceptions
to confidentiality that allow mediators to testify, even though the
incompetency provision is phrased in absolute terms and such judge-
made exceptions are not authorized by the state statute.46 The UMA
would cure such ambiguities by clearly defining the legal format using
the familiar construct of privilege, simultaneously bringing the form of
confidentiality protection into alignment with its functions.
Along with ambiguity, many mediation statutes create uncertainty
due to gaps in their coverage. While awareness of the issues that
drafters need to anticipate has grown along with growth in the scope and
STAT. ANN. § 13-22-307(a) (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.3 (West Supp. 2000);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a(a) (Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(E) (West Supp.
2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023(C)(1)-(2) (Anderson 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §
36.222(3) (1999); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.073(b) (Vernon 1997). Other statutes
make the mediator a joint holder with the parties. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-8
(Supp. 2000).
44. See supra Part II.
45. Mediation is covered in sections 1115-1128 of the California Evidence Code under
the heading "Evidence... Excluded by Extrinsic Policies." Consistent with an evidentiary
exclusion, section 1119 makes written or oral communications during mediation inadmissible.
In addition, however, section 1122, entitled "conditions to admissibility," permits disclosure if
agreed to and put in writing. This section thus appears to function as a waiver provision with
all the parties and the mediator holding the equivalent of a privilege. Even so, its
implications are not entirely clear. Compare Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal Rptr. 2d 464,
468 n.3 (Ct. App. 1998) (confidentiality may be waived), with Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68
F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1129 n.23 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (wording suggests waivers by parties would not
be sufficient for disclosure unless mediator and any nonparty participants also waive).
46. Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70,472-73 (holding that mediator's testimony could be
compelled if necessary to protect against perjury and to uphold defendant's due process right
to cross-examine and impeach adverse witness); Olam, 68 F. Supp at 1129 (hearing mediator's
testimony on plaintiff's claim that mediated memorandum of understanding was obtained by
duress).
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frequency of mediation, many statutes are nonetheless dated and omit
topics that have proved important as mediation has continued to
develop. For example, one source of uncertainty for mediation
confidentiality stems from unresolved conflicts with other areas of state
law that require or permit disclosures. Many state mediation statutes do
not include any guidance for recurring conflicts that occur between the
goal of mediation confidentiality and policies that encourage or require
disclosures on topics such as child abuse, ongoing crime, or mediator
misconduct.47 The UMA solves this problem with a list of explicit
exceptions drawn from the cumulative experience of the states. 8
Another type of policy conflict often left unresolved in state
mediation statutes arises in conjunction with efforts to enforce or resist
enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from mediation. 9 On
one hand, many states require written signed settlement agreements' or
47. Some states at least partially resolve such policy conflicts between disclosure and
confidentiality. One approach is a comprehensive resolution subordinating mediation
confidentiality to all state statutes that include disclosure requirements. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(3) (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-306(2)(c) (West 1997);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (b)(4) (Supp. 1999). Other states make individual statutory
exceptions to mediation confidentiality for specific disclosures. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §8
679C.2(5) (child abuse), 679C.2(6) (claim against mediator), 679C.2(4) (ongoing or future
"criminal activity") (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-452a(b)(2) (child abuse), 60-
452a(b)(1) (claims against neutral), 60-452a(b)(iii) (ongoing criminal activity) (Supp. 1999);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.222(5) (claim against mediator), 36.222(6) (child abuse) (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-32 (claim against mediator), 19-13-32 (crime or fraud) (Michie
Supp. 2000); Utah Code Ann § 78-31b-8(6) (2000) (child abuse); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.070(1)(g) (West 1995) (claim against mediator); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(d) (West
2000) (child abuse); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-43-103(c)(iii) (child abuse), 1-43-103(c)(ii)
(future crime or harmful act) (Michie 1999). In some states, unresolved conflicts with statutes
that require disclosures are assigned to the courts to consider on a case-by-case basis. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206(c) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(D) (West
Supp. 2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(e) (West 2001).
48. MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 12, § 7 Reporter's Working Notes § 2. See infra note
102 (listing exceptions).
49. See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law
Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
50. These requirements may be specific to mediated settlement agreements. See, e.g.,
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(G) (Supp. IV 1998); FLA.
R. CIV. PRO. 1.730; IND. CT. ADR R. 2.7(E)(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.35 (West 2000);
N.C. SUPER. Cr. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONF. R. 4(C); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(4)(d)
(McKinney Supp. 2001) (community dispute resolution centers program); UTAH CT. R.
101(e). Or they may apply to any settlement of a lawsuit. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. PRO.
81(e); ARIZ. R. CIV. PROC. 80(d); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (West Supp. 2001); MICH.
Cr. RULE 2.507(H); NEV. R. DIST. CT. 16; N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-2-4 (Michie 1999)
(settlements terminating marriages); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.&R. § 2104 (McKinney 1978);
TEXAS R. CIV. PRO. 11.
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link a writing requirement directly to an evidentiary limitation.51 On the
other hand, state contract law often recognizes oral agreements.52
Proving an oral agreement has deleterious consequences for
confidentiality because it typically necessitates testimony about
mediation communications. 3 While many courts have resolved this
conflict in favor of a signed writing and thus maintained confidentiality
in mediation,' a significant number of other courts have instead applied
general state contract principles permitting oral contracts. Some courts
51. For example, some privilege statutes make an exception for the disclosure of
settlement agreements only when they are written and signed. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-22-302(2.5) (West 1997) ("mediation communication" in court-annexed ADR
protected by privilege defined to exclude written, executed settlement agreements); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 2001) (exception to privilege for court-ordered
mediation limited to executed settlement agreements); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023
(Anderson 1998) (mediation provisions do not affect admissibility of written, signed
settlement agreement); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070(1)(e) (West 1995) (exception to
mediation privilege for written agreement signed by the parties resulting from a mediation
proceeding).
52. See, e.g., Lampe v. O'Toole, 685 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding properly
proved oral settlement is enforceable even without signed release); John Deere Co. v. A & H
Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding settlement agreement
enforceable even though not reduced to writing, signed by the parties or entered on the
minutes of the court).
53. See, e.g., Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Ind. 2000) ("nearly everything said
during a mediation session could bear on either whether the disputants came to an agreement
or the content of the agreement") (quoting NCCUSL, UMA DRAFt § 8(a)(1) Reporter's
Notes § 2 (Mar. 2000)); Wilmington Hospitality, L.L.C. v. New Castle County, Civ. A. No.
18436, 2001 WL 291948, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7,2001) ("[When] there is no written settlement
signed by anyone, it is impossible for the parties to litigate over the terms of the putative
agreement without breaching the confidentiality of the mediation process in a substantial
way."). For example, when the court in Few v. Hammack Enter., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665, 669-70
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999), affirmed a finding that the parties had reached an oral settlement in
mediation, its decision was based on an evidentiary hearing with testimony describing the
mediation.
54. Some courts have interpreted a writing requirement to preclude evidence of oral
agreements. See, e.g., Hanna v. Schmidt, 707 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Schwartz
v. Adamson, No. C8-98-1416, 1999 WL 170676, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 30, 1999); Bartley v.
Fed. Express Corp., 683 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); see also Vernon, 732 N.E.2d 805
(reading writing requirement into state mediation provision in order to protect
confidentiality). Others have interpreted a privilege or an evidentiary exclusion to preclude
evidence of oral agreements. See, e.g., Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 641 So. 2d
515, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Kennedy v. Emge, 972 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998);
Zidell v. Zidell, No. 05-96-00052-CV, 1997 WL 424429 (Tex. App. July 30, 1997).
55. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Doe, 903 P.2d 375 (Or. App. 1995) (holding
that a mediated settlement agreement need not be in writing to be binding), modified on
other grounds, 908 P.2d 850 (Or. App. 1996); see also Ashley Furniture Indus. v. Sangiacomo
N.A., 187 F.3d 363, 378 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a mediated settlement agreement on
trade dress issues need not be written to be enforceable under North Carolina law); Sheng v.
Starkey Lab., Inc., 117 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997) (enforcing an oral mediated agreement under
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are even willing to enforce written but unsigned documents using the
fiction that they indicate valid oral agreements. 6 The UMA protects
against confidentiality breaches to prove oral agreements by limiting its
exception to executed agreements that can be proved by a written
document or other record. 7
The difficulties deepen when the issue is not the existence of an
agreement, but whether the agreement was validly reached. 8 Proving a
contract defense such as fraud or coercion typically involves examining
the mediation process in a way that poses a threat to confidentiality, but
this threat cannot be avoided by the simple means of requiring a written
agreement as a prerequisite to enforcement. 9 For this intractable
problem of contract defenses, the UMA established one of its few
opportunities for balancing the equities in an individual case.'
Another important omission in state statutes is that they fail to
provide procedures for courts to use when they consider a request for an
exception to confidentiality that is either assigned to the courts on a
case-by-case basis or unaddressed in the mediation statute. As a result,
courts have waived confidentiality summarily' or invented their own
procedures to maintain confidentiality during their decision process
(along with their own standards for the decision). 2 The importance of
such procedures becomes evident when testimony is taken in open court
on a confidentiality issue. The conclusion is foregone: the evidence has
already been made public. As observed by the Olam court, "use of an
Minnesota principles of contract law); New York Air Brake Corp. v. General Signal Corp.,
873 F. Supp. 747 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (enforcing an oral employment settlement under New York
law).
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 176 F.3d 475 (Table), No. 97-
2786, 1999 WL 198799 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 1999) (enforcing unsigned mediated agreement on a
finding that mediation communications demonstrated an oral agreement); Power Serv., Inc. v.
MCI Constructors, Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-927-A, 2000 WL 459436 (E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2000)
(finding binding oral agreement evidenced by unsigned settlement memorandum); Few v.
Hammack Enter., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665, 671 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (remanding for hearing on
exact terms of oral settlement after affirming that parties' agreement was evidenced by
unsigned document).
57. MAY2001 DRAFT, supra note 12, § 7(a)(1); [UMA § 6(a)(1)].
58. See generally Deason, supra note 49.
59. While a signed writing provides strong evidence that the parties intended an
agreement, it typically cannot resolve whether the agreement was procured by fraud, duress,
or without settlement authority.
60. This policy decision is discussed infra Part IV.
61. See, e.g., Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
62. See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(mediator's testimony under seal); Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469-70,
472-73 (Ct. App. 1998) (mediator's testimony in camera).
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insensitive procedure to determine the probative significance of the
protected communications could cause severe damage to the
substantive... privilege rights."'  Only a few states provide a
mechanism, such as an in camera hearing, to ensure that confidentiality
is maintained while courts decide whether an exception to
confidentiality provisions is appropriate.64 Some statutes that even
explicitly authorize courts to balance the equities do not set forth
protective procedures.6
These and other holes and ambiguities in statutory coverage create a
confusing diversity of provisions among the states. Even within a single
state, these holes and ambiguities contribute to uncertainty about the
scope of confidentiality protections because the courts lack guidance. In
contrast, the UMA drafters have benefited from experience with the full
spectrum of state statutes and issues raised in court cases. The UMA
incorporates this experience into a comprehensive treatment of
confidentiality issues that anticipates tension points where
confidentiality can become an issue.
2. Uncertainty in the Determination of Applicable Law
The focus of the prior section on interpretive issues assumes that one
knows what law a court will be interpreting. The applicable law is,
however, a major source of uncertainty for mediation confidentiality.6
Choice of law is a notoriously difficult element to predict in many multi-
state lawsuits.' Under the best of circumstances, horizontal choice of
63. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
64. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206(c) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4112(D) (West Supp. 2000); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(e) (West
2001) (all providing in camera procedure for resolving conflicts between confidentiality
requirements and other statutes requiring disclosure); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2908
(1998) (providing that in mediation under the Parenting Act, certain disclosures of abuse or
neglect shall be reported to the judge for an in camera hearing on whether to make a report
to the state Department of Health and Human Services).
65. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-235d(b)(4) (1999) (permitting courts to allow
disclosure if interest of justice outweighs the need for confidentiality); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2000) (permitting courts to make individualized confidentiality
decisions when settlement interpretation of enforcement is at issue); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.023(C)(4) (Anderson 1998) (permitting court exception to prevent manifest injustice);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(e) (West 2000) (permitting exception in similar circumstances).
66. See, e.g., Deason, supra note 34; Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on
Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 157
(1994).
67. See RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 4 (4th ed.
2001) ("IT]here are factors involved in choosing the applicable law other than insuring
uniformity of result and at least equally as important as the uniformity factor.").
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state law is plagued by the great variation in the appropriate mode of
analysis, which depends on both the forum state and the subject matter
of the case.6 The disparities among current state mediation laws only
exacerbate the baseline uncertainty normally associated with the
complexity of the choice-of-law analysis. The great variation among the
states means that the law a court chooses to apply in deciding a
confidentiality issue can be crucial to the outcome. Exceptions that
permit disclosure of mediation communications under one state's law
may not exist under another state's law. Or, even more dramatically, a
mediation without any protection under one state's law may be strictly
confidential under that of another.
Vertical choice of law between state and federal law can also be
inscrutable, particularly on an issue like confidentiality that straddles the
line between substance and procedure. Again the challenge is
magnified in the context of mediation, where the federal court's analysis
of choice of law depends on the form of confidentiality protection at
issue. Why should this discussion of a state uniform law take note of
federal choice of law issues? Recall that parties to a mediation typically
do not know what court might decide future legal issues concerning that
mediation if those issues arise. The fate of mediation confidentiality in
federal court therefore forms part of a party's calculus when considering
a strategy for a prospective mediation. As states try to provide a legal
climate that will optimize the mediation process they must consider that,
from the parties' point of view, uncertainty about confidentiality in
federal court can undermine the predictability created under state law.
Confidentiality is unusual in that many different federal rules can
control the choice of law depending on the legal format chosen to
protect against disclosure. The applicable law of privilege, the form of
protection chosen for the UMA and already adopted by many states,9 is
determined under Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 501.7 If the rule
68. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES, et al., CONFLIcr OF LAWS (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
seven different choice-of-law methodologies for tort and contract conflicts).
69. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
679C.2-679C.3 (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001); ME. R. EVID. § 408; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.023
(Baldwin 1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805 (1993); OR. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.222
(Anderson 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-
13-32 (Michie Supp. 2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.053(c) (Vernon 1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-8(2)(b) (Supp. 2000) (court ADR program); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-581.22 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070 (West 1995); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-43-103 (Michie 1999).
70. Rule 501 provides:
[85:79
MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
of decision is federal, the court is directed to rely on federal common
law. Conversely, if the rule of decision is state, the court is directed to
apply state law of privilege. When a case is a mix of federal claims and
pendent state-law claims, most circuits apply the federal law of
privilege.71 Some courts, however, take a piecemeal claim-by-claim
approach and apply state privilege law to evidence relating to a state-
law claim regardless of the composition of the overall case.' This
interpretation is important for mediation because so many disputes that
raise confidentiality issues concern the existence, interpretation, or
validity of a mediated settlement agreement, matters typically
considered under state contract rules of decision.
In Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., the underlying claims were a mix
of federal and pendent state law issues.73 When the plaintiff claimed
duress and rejected the settlement agreement the parties had signed in
mediation, the court separated this enforcement dispute from the
underlying federal and state-law issues for purposes of choice-of-law
analysis.74 To determine whether it should look to the federal or state
law of privilege, the court applied FRE 501 to the duress claim standing
alone, and selected state privilege law because state law would supply
the rule of decision for this contract claim." If other federal courts
GENERAL RULE. Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
71. See, eg., Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65-66 (3d Cir. 2000); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 466-67
(11th Cir. 1992); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1372 (6th Cir. 1992); von Bulow v. von
Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987); Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671
F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982); Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 & n.3 (7th Cir.
1981).
72. See, eg., Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995); Waterloo
Gutter Protection Sys. Co v. Absolute Gutter Prot., L.L.C., 64 F. Supp. 2d 398, 411-15 (D.N.J.
1999); Freeman v. Fairman, 917 F. Supp. 586, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Evanko v. Elec. Sys.
Assoc., No. 91 Civ. 2851, 1993 WL 14458, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993); Shaklee Corp. v.
Gunnell, 110 F.R.D. 190, 192 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
73. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110,1115 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
74. Id. at 1119.
75. Id. at 1121. If the court had looked to the underlying mix of federal and state claims,
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follow this lead and sever issues concerning settlements for purposes of
determining applicable law, and if states adopt the UMA widely, then
predictability would be enhanced because uniform state privilege law
would govern most confidentiality issues concerning mediated
settlement agreements. The immediate effect of the Olam decision,
however, is to contribute to the uncertainty about confidentiality, for its
analytical technique of segregating a single claim has been rejected in
other situations where a party similarly claimed a privilege for evidence
that would be relevant only to a state law claim. 6 This adds doubt to
any prediction about what analytical path a court would choose to
follow to select the law of privilege.
Moreover, courts have additional analytical options. Instead of
framing the question in terms of the applicable law of privilege, a court
may instead ask what law governs the settlement agreement. Courts
thus far have not developed a coherent theory to answer this question.
For example, in selecting the law to govern settlements of federal
claims, some courts focus on the need to protect the federal statutory
right that the parties are releasing and tend to apply federal common
law to evaluate the settlement;77 other courts emphasize the contractual
nature of settlement and tend to apply state contract law.' Courts are
it would have applied federal common law confidentiality rules under Ninth Circuit
precedent. See, e.g., Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d
1164,1169 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 899 F. Supp. 206, 208 (M.D. Pa.
1995) (order on reconsideration) (stating in dicta that even if accountant privilege were
relevant only to the pendent state claim, federal law of privilege would govern); Smith v.
Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 671 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (stating in dicta that even if mediation privilege
were relevant only to pendant state claim, federal law of privilege would "superseded any
contrary state law"); Doe v. Special Investigations Agency, 779 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(applying principles of federal privilege in cases with federal and state claims even though
evidence sought was relevant only to the pendent state law claim).
77. See, e.g., Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217,220 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding when the
underlying cause of action is federal, motion to enforce settlement agreement is determined
by federal law); Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that federal
common law principles govern construction of a settlement agreement involving a right to sue
derived from a federal statute).
78. See, e.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (interpreting release contained in settlement agreement according to state
law); Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that construction and
enforcement of settlement agreements is governed by local law on interpretation of
contracts); Eastern Energy, Inc. v. Unico Oil & Gas, Inc., 861 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1988)
(stating that "construction and enforcement of settlement agreements is governed by
principles of state law applicable to contracts generally"). See also Sheng v. Starkey Lab.,
Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083 n.1 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying state contract law to determine
enforceability of a mediated settlement agreement in a Title VII claim without resolving the
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split both within and among the circuits, leaving the parties to roll the
dice on applicable law."
Furthermore, there are other arrows in a court's analytical quiver
that may be appropriate depending on the legal form of the
confidentiality protection at issue. FRE 501 guides courts in
determining the applicable law of privilege, but the analysis differs when
other evidentiary mechanisms are employed to protect confidentiality.
An alternative (or additional) state law mechanism makes the mediator
incompetent to testify.?° Under federal law all witnesses are competent,
but FRE 601 directs the federal courts to use state competency rules
when state law supplies the rule of decision.8 ' For other forms of
confidentiality protection, the Erie doctrine is the source of the
appropriate analysis for applicable law. It governs the applicability in
federal court of evidentiary exclusions used by many states to provide
confidentiality for mediation communications and of writing
general question of applicable law).
79. See, e.g., Heuser v. Kephart, 215 F.3d 1186, 1190 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
divergence of views on the law governing actions for breach of settlement of a Title VII
claim); Fleming v. United States Postal Serv., 27 F.3d 259, 260 (7th Cir. 1994) ("it remains
unsettled in this circuit whether a dispute over the settlement of a federal case arises under
state law--on the theory... that it is merely a contract dispute with a remote federal origin-
or under federal law") (citing contradictory cases). See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACI'CE & PROCEDURE § 4541 (2d ed. 1996).
80. See, e.g., CAL EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(a) (West
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9 (West 2000). Other states protect mediators from being
subpoenaed to testify at another's behest. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(C)
(West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §16-7-206(b) (Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a(a)
(Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(b)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (parties also not
subject to process or subpoena); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.014(1) (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. 48.109(3) (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805(C) (West 1993) (parties also
exempt from judicial process); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 904.085(3)(b) (West 2000). Some courts have adopted similar provisions. See, e.g., M.D.
Pa. Local R. 16.8.6 (f) ("The mediator shall not be called as a witness at trial."); Ind. ADR R.
2.11, IND. CODE tit. 34 app. Court Rules (Civil) (mediators not subject to process).
81. Rule 601 provides:
GENERAL RULE OF COMPETENCY. Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which state law
supplies the rule of decision, the competence of a witness shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 601.
82. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §16-7-206(a) (Michie 1999); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119
(West Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2914
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109(3) (Michie 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LANVS § 19-13-32
(Michie Supp. 2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) (Vernon 1997);WIS.
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requirements for settlement agreements that prevent exposure of
mediation communications in enforcement disputes.'
This multiplicity of analytical approaches would not be significant
for predictability if all the approaches pointed to the same conclusions
for choice of law. After all, under both FRE 501 and FRE 601, courts
take their cue from the "rule of decision," and that concept also features
prominently in the Erie analysis. Despite this superficial similarity,
however, the outcome of the different doctrinal analyses need not be
identical. As discussed above in the context of enforcing settlement
agreements, courts' determinations of the appropriate rule of decision
are themselves fraught with inconsistencies. Moreover, under the Erie
doctrine, federal courts invoke the rule of decision analysis only when
the issue is substantive, for example outcome determinative, as opposed
to procedural.& Mediation confidentiality protections could be classified
as either: limits on the disclosure of mediation communications serve
substantive state interests in encouraging mediation, however these
state provisions are typically found in procedural rules and many
operate procedurally through their control of evidence." Courts have
not taken a consistent position on whether such rules should be treated
as substantive or procedural.86
In sum, because states currently use so many different legal
frameworks to protect mediation confidentiality, because these statutory
frameworks can be ambiguous to categorize, and because federal courts
use different analytical approaches to choice of law depending on their
categorization of the mechanism at issue, vertical choice of law for
confidentiality is an amazingly complex, multi-factorial analysis. It is
hard to avoid concluding that, under current conditions, predicting the
law that will govern a confidentiality dispute between mediation parties
in federal court is a virtually impossible task.
STAT. ANN. § 904.085(3)(a) (West 2000).
83. See supra note 47 (citing statutes).
84. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-68 (1965); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945).
85. The federal evidentiary exclusion that protects settlement negotiations to some
extent is also found in a procedural rule. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
86. Compare Rheault v. Luftansa German Airlines, 899 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (refusing to apply Michigan court rule that requires a writing for settlement agreements
because the rule is procedural, not substantive), with Lefevre v. Keaty, 191 F.3d 596 (5th Cir.
1999) (applying state law rule requiring written settlement to mediated agreement). See also
Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (applying state
procedural and evidentiary law to quash mediator subpoena regarding settlement of Jones
Act case controlled by substantive federal law).
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In this environment, the possibility of uniformity offered by the
UMA is a tantalizingly simple solution to the uncertainties that
currently plague mediation confidentiality law. If adopted widely, the
Act would make choice of law among the states irrelevant and would
eliminate many of the sources of confusion that make interpreting
current statutes difficult. State law cannot, of course, completely
determine confidentiality in federal court, but it applies in a significant
number of cases and it can influence the development of federal
common law in the direction of effective, consistent protections for
mediation confidentiality.
C. Contributions of State Uniformity
First, greater uniformity in state confidentiality provisions would
significantly improve parties' abilities to predict the protection they can
expect for their mediation communications. The UMA is an
improvement on almost every existing state statute in terms of its
comprehensive coverage of confidentiality issues that are likely to arise.
Moreover, it avoids the ambiguities that now leave room for multiple
interpretations by different courts. These two developments, without
more, would increase parties' confidence in their expectations for
confidentiality. Additionally, uncertainty in interpretation would
decline as a body of case law develops around the common statute.
While not binding, decisions from courts in other states could provide
some guidance for parties and courts in jurisdictions that have yet to
decide issues under the Act.
It does not seem accidental that states with comprehensive
mediation statutes-Texas,8 Floridas Ohio,' Oregon and California,'
to name a few-are also leaders in incorporating mediation into their
patterns of dispute resolution, both in and out of court. This association
between statutory protection for confidentiality and the use of
mediation does not, of course, prove a causative link. However, if
confidentiality is important in mediation, it is logical that a unified
framework for protecting it can have a beneficial effect. If so,
nationwide uniformity should stimulate and encourage the use of
87. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.0001-073 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.
2001).
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 2001) (court-ordered mediation); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.183 (West 2001) (marital relations).
89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023 (Anderson 1998).
90. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.100-36.245 (1999).
91. CAL EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
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mediation.
Why then do we not see examples of the converse of this prediction?
One might expect a reduction in the use or effectiveness of mediation
when parties lack confidentiality protections.' One response is that
confidentiality problems have not yet become frequent enough to
generate any measurable negative effect. This effect is a function of the
overall level at which parties use mediation. Thankfully, only a small
proportion of mediations develop problems that threaten to expose
mediation communications that the parties had expected would be
confidential. Thus, with a relatively low number of mediations,
uncertain expectations for confidentiality do not have the potential to
disrupt the process in the way that they do as mediation becomes more
established.
Until recently, it was probably not really necessary for mediation
participants to explore the limitations of confidentiality in detail.
Blanket assurances from the mediator that their communications would
not be disclosed might not have been entirely accurate, but they were
unlikely to prove wrong in any particular case. More importantly, the
dearth of confidentiality disputes meant that an imprecise assurance of
complete confidentiality could satisfy the parties and their counsel.
They were unlikely to confront instances of court-ordered disclosures
that would make them worry about the prospect for disclosures in their
own case.93 As the frequency of mediation has risen, however, so has
the prevalence of litigation that involves challenges to confidentiality.
9 4
It inevitably follows that parties will become more aware of the
limitations of confidentiality protections. While it may be, as Professor
Hughes has argued, that uncertainty about confidentiality has not
previously inhibited the growth of mediation,95 that potential is growing.
Thus, at the present time, predictability is increasingly important in
order to avoid confused expectations and the adverse consequences they
may create for mediation.
92- See, e.g., Green, supra note 6, at 36.
93. See, e.g., Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 6, at 42 (reporting that "most mediation is
now done under the assumption that communications are privileged under the law, even if
they really are not privileged").
94. This conclusion is based on my personal impression that reported cases concerning
confidentiality issues have increased, especially in the last few years. The increased
involvement of courts in sponsoring mediation may also be related to the number of
secondary disputes that implicate confidentiality. It may be that cases already in litigation
when mediation takes place are more likely to generate further litigation than cases that are
mediated without a filed suit.
95. See Hughes, supra note 6.
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Next, and somewhat ironically, uniform state-law confidentiality
provisions would be a practical way to increase predictability in the
federal courts and thus in the overall climate for mediation. The federal
courts operate their mediation programs under local court rules, a
framework that encourages inconsistent confidentiality protections."
There is, at present, no movement toward a national federal court rule
or a more broadly applicable statutory mediation privilege. Thus the
impetus toward more effective mediation confidentiality largely remains
with the states.
A uniform state framework for confidentiality would at least reduce
many of the interpretation problems that arise when federal courts
apply state confidentiality law. Not only would the starting point for a
federal court's reading be more clear than many current state statutes,
but soon there would be a developed body of state law to inform federal
courts' interpretations. Additionally, by establishing privilege as the
means to protect confidentiality, the UMA would greatly reduce the
problems inherent in predicting a court's selection from the multiple
choice-of-law analyses that apply depending on the type of legal
protection at issue.
State uniformity could also play a significant role in the development
of federal protections for mediation confidentiality by encouraging a
federal mediation privilege. When federal courts consider recognizing a
federal common law privilege, they must evaluate, among other factors,
whether the privilege would serve public ends and how it would affect
state practices.' Widespread state adoption of the UMA would be
strong evidence that public policy supports a mediation privilege. As
stated in Jaffee v. Redmond, "the existence of a consensus among the
States indicates that 'reason and experience' support recognition of the
privilege.""' Moreover, in adopting a psychotherapist privilege in that
case, the Supreme Court noted that the appropriateness of the privilege
"is confirmed by the fact that all 50 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege."" State
96. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
See generally Gregory A. Litt, Note, No Confidence: The Problem of Confidentiality by Local
Rule in the ADR Act of 1998,78 Thx. L. REv. 1015 (2000).
97. The privilege analysis was set forth most recently in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,
9-13 (1996), which recognized a federal common law psychotherapist-patient privilege under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 12. The Court also noted that a psychotherapist privilege was included among
the specific privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee for adoption as part of the
2001]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
adoption of the UMA would similarly support recognition of a
mediation privilege by the federal courts. Just as importantly, it would
simplify a federal court's task of defining a common law privilege when
it adopts one. With the UMA as a model, the federal courts could
follow the states' lead and boost both vertical and horizontal uniformity
of law, enhancing predictability to the maximum extent possible.
In sum, because of the normal doctrinal complexities that determine
where a suit is filed and what law will determine the outcome of the
dispute, forecasting the location and nature of lawsuits is always
difficult. It is even more challenging when the dispute concerns
confidentiality, because of the potential interaction between the type of
protection and the choice of law analysis. The most effective way to
foster predictability is to avoid these worries entirely by creating a
system in which, wherever a suit is filed and whatever law is applied, the
outcome for mediation confidentiality will be the same because all
possible forums have adopted the UMA.
IV. THE UMA'S CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTIONS
Even if one is convinced of the benefits of uniformity in state
mediation law, one may still have objections to the uniformity decisions
embodied in the UMA. It may be the case that "a compromise that no
one likes is a good compromise" is applicable here. From my point of
view, the UMA is not perfect. Like Professor Hughes,' °° I have argued
that mediator testimony should not be put off-limits for disputes about
mediated settlement agreements. In my view, it should be permitted,
but only rarely when circumstances leave no alternative.0 ' I am
confident that most academics, mediation practitioners, and state
legislative drafting committees can find some provision on which they
disagree with the UMA. The issue then becomes whether the topic of
the disagreement is important enough to stand in the way of the goal of
uniformity.
Disagreements over UMA provisions are perhaps inevitable given
that confidentiality is not an absolute value. Maintaining confidentiality
in mediation must compete with important interests in other contexts
that are furthered by disclosures of certain communications. Most of
Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 14-15. The fact that a mediation privilege was not included
on this list should not be significant, however, given the dearth of mediation at the time
compared to its present frequency.
100. See Hughes Article, supra note 5.
101. See Deason, supra note 49.
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the statutory exceptions to mediation confidentiality are based on policy
judgments that in specific circumstances the need for disclosure exceeds
the benefit of maintaining mediation confidentiality. These judgments
are often close calls on which reasonable decision-makers may disagree,
which helps explain the wide variation and resulting lack of
predictability in current statutes.
When a current state statute differs from the UMA on one of these
close policy calls, the state will have to decide if its prior policy choice
justifies rejecting or modifying the UMA. In many instances, the UMA
policy choice may be acceptable. If there are objections, however, states
should not reject the UMA approach in its entirety. It may be that
taking a positive step toward uniformity in mediation confidentiality is
more important than the precise form of the confidentiality protections.
The UMA may also be controversial in states without a comprehensive
statute, but these states have an additional reason to embrace the Act.
Based on the experience of states that take a unified approach to
mediation, those that currently live with piecemeal statutory coverage
will encourage the growth of mediation by adopting the UMA.
The UMA reflects the complexity of policy choices evidenced by the
variation among current statutes with a carefully constructed set of
exceptions to confidentiality that are defined for specific
circumstances.1" The need for these exceptions was evaluated by
drawing on state experience with existing statutory provisions and on
disclosure issues raised in court.'O' The UMA's list of exceptions thus
incorporates state determinations that, on balance, particular public
interests requiring disclosure outweigh the need to maintain certain
types of mediation communications in confidence.' By standardizing
this list of exceptions, the UMA makes clear the precise limits on
confidentiality, and by doing so greatly enhances predictability. For
example, an informed party would know that certain threats of crime,
102. MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 12, § 7(a); [UMA § 6(a)]. Section 7(a) lists seven
exceptions to privilege: (1) There is no privilege for a mediation communication that is in a
recorded agreement signed by the parties; (2) information publicly available or made in a
mediation open to the public; (3) a threat to inflict bodily injury; (4) information used to plan,
commit, or conceal a crime; (5) information relevant to abuse and neglect in a proceeding
where a child or adult protective service is a party; (6) information relevant to a claim of
malpractice or professional misconduct filed against a mediator; (7) or information relevant
to a claim of malpractice or professional misconduct filed against a party or participant based
on their conduct in mediation except that a mediator may not be compelled to give evidence
about this communication. Id.
103. See id. § 7 Reporter's Notes.
104. See supra note 47.
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discussions of child abuse, or unethical professional conduct in
mediation are potentially subject to disclosure. These are targeted
disclosures that apply only to a limited extent to fulfill the purposes of
the exception.' 5
There remain, however, even more difficult situations that
sometimes call for an exception, but for which an exception may not
always be appropriate. These situations are virtually impossible to
consider divorced from the circumstances of a specific case; the policy
decisions are very close and depend on the specific facts. The UMA
recognizes two types of proceedings in which a bright line rule for all
cases is not appropriate-court proceedings involving a felony and
proceedings to reform or avoid an agreement reached in mediation.'
16
The drafters concluded that mediation communications should usually
remain confidential in these proceedings, but anticipate some scenarios
in which denying disclosure could work an injustice."° Therefore the
Act permits disclosure of mediation communications in a felony case or
in a challenge to a settlement agreement only when a court decides it is
necessary following statutory guidance."° The court's decision is to be
based on a comparison between the merits of disclosure and maintaining
confidentiality, in the context of the particular mediation and the
particular lawsuit. The statutory standard for overcoming
confidentiality is high: the party seeking discovery or to introduce the
evidence must show that it is otherwise unavailable and "substantially
outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality. "1
The difficulty in crafting an appropriate policy for mediation
confidentiality in criminal cases is illustrated by the total lack of
consensus among current statutes. Some states define their
confidentiality protection so that it does not apply at all in criminal
proceedings.' Other states are inclusive, drawing no distinction
105. A court may admit only the portion of the communication necessary for purposes
of the exception. MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 12, § 7(d); [UMA § 6(d)]. This disclosure
does not make the communication, or other mediation communications, discoverable or
admissible for any other purpose. Id.
106. Id. § 7(b); [UMA § 6(b)].
107. See, e.g., id. §§ 5 Reporter's Notes § 5,7 Reporter's Notes § 11.
108. Id. § 7(b); [UMA § 6(b)].
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (evidentiary exclusion
of mediation communications applicable in a "noncriminal proceeding"); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-811 (1999) (mediation privilege in domestic relations cases applies only in civil actions,
with some exceptions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023(B) (Anderson 1998) (mediation
privilege for civil and administrative proceedings).
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between the application of their privilege in civil and criminal
proceedings."' In the middle ground, states apply their confidentiality
protections in some, but not all, criminal proceedings."' This variability
reflects the multitude of possible judgments that can be made on the
challenging issues that arise in this context.
Court decisions are similarly split, which also supports the
conclusion that it is difficult to ascertain, in the abstract, the need for
mediation confidentiality in criminal cases. In some circumstances
courts have pierced confidentiality, reasoning that the loss of evidence
could seriously damage the accuracy of the proceeding or impinge on
constitutional rights."' In other jurisdictions, however, courts have
rejected a limitation on mediation confidentiality in criminal
proceedings and concluded that a breach of confidentiality, even in a
criminal case, would have too great a chilling effect on mediation and
cannot be permitted. 4
Earlier drafts of the UMA attempted to forge a single "bright-line"
policy for mediation confidentiality in criminal cases,"1 5 but this attempt
was unsuccessful. In explaining why the UMA leaves the decision to the
courts, the Reporters note the desirability of some mediation programs
that in all likelihood will involve discussions of crime, such as mediations
among youth gangs.16 If mediation communications are not privileged
111. See, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206(a) (Michie 1999) (covering dispute
resolution communications "relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.2 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (privilege applies "in any judicial or
administrative proceeding"); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.222(7) (1999) (limitations on disclosure
apply in "any subsequent judicial proceeding, administrative proceeding or arbitration
proceeding").
112. See, e.g., IDAHO R. EVID. 507(2) (client has mediation privilege "in any civil or
criminal action to which the client is a party").
113. See, e.g., Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding
mediation confidentiality provisions inapplicable in juvenile delinquency proceeding in order
to preserve minor's right to effective cross-examination and impeachment of an adverse
witness); State v. Casteliano, 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to quash
subpoena of mediator when accused claimed that threats made during the mediation would
support his plea of self defense).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognizing
federal mediation privilege in criminal case for statements made during mediation in
community program); Bird v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to recognize
an exception to state mediation privilege in criminal proceeding for statements made in court-
sponsored criminal mediation); People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
(deciding that when legislature established Community Mediation Centers the intent was to
keep communications confidential even in criminal cases).
115. See, e.g., NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA § 5(a) (Dec. 2000) (privilege applies in civil
proceedings, including juvenile court proceedings, and in criminal misdemeanor proceedings).
116. See MAY 2001 DRAFr, supra note 12, § 5 Reporter's Notes § 5.
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in criminal cases, it could diminish the effectiveness of such progress.
They also note the risk that strict confidentiality requirements will in
some cases violate rights conferred by the U.S. Constitution.,7 The
strength of these competing concerns cannot be evaluated, however,
without taking into account the circumstances of the individual case.
For example, constitutional rights will not affect the balance for or
against disclosure unless it is the defendant who seeks to introduce
mediation communications. It is criminal defendants who have a right,
rooted in both the Due Process Clause and the Compulsory Process
Clause, to testify on their own behalf." Similarly, the right to cross-
examine a witness originates in the Confrontation Clause and is held by
criminal defendants, not the prosecution."9
Moreover, in Rock v. Arkansas"° the Supreme Court mandated a
case-by-case analysis when a defendant's right to testify is at stake.
While recognizing that the right to present relevant evidence is not
without limitation, the Court overturned a state per se rule that excluded
testimony if the witness had been hypnotized.' Despite all the
inaccuracies that could have been introduced into the defendant's
memory by suggestion, the Court reasoned that the need for the
testimony and the effects of hypnosis would vary with individual
circumstances that should be weighed when a defendant's right to testify
is at stake.22 It is therefore unlikely that a state could constitutionally
enact a per se rule that would prevent all defendants from testifying
about events in mediation without an individualized analysis of
admissibility.
The states also part company in their policies toward permitting
contract defenses to a settlement agreement to invade mediation
confidentiality. Statutes are often silent on this issue, but those that
resolve it do so in conflicting ways, many of them imposing a categorical
rule." Courts without statutory guidance have tended either to assume
117. Id.
118. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
119. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding that refusal to allow a
defendant to cross-examine a key prosecution witness regarding his probation status denied
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation despite state policy to maintain the
confidentiality of juvenile delinquency adjudications).
120. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
121. Id. at 51-53.
122. The Court made clear that it was not considering the admissibility of testimony by
previously hypnotized prosecution witnesses. Id. at 58 n.14.
123. The largest group of states protects confidentiality of mediation without any explicit
provision for considering defenses to enforcement of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., ARIZ.
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that a contract defense justifies mediation disclosures 24 or to weigh the
need for disclosure in the particular case.1 5
As with the question of mediation confidentiality in criminal cases, a
decision on permitting disclosures relevant to contract defenses should
not be made outside the context of a particular dispute. A blanket rule
that permits parties to raise contract defenses or an equally broad rule
that prohibits them from ever doing so would, in either case, create
incentives harmful to the goals of mediation. If mediation parties could
freely disclose mediation communications in any challenge to the
validity of a settlement agreement, there would be no limit on the use of
duress or other contract defenses to invade the confidentiality of a
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §16-7-206 (Michie 1999); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1123 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West 1998 &
Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (1994 & Supp. 1999); ME. R. EVID. § 408; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-813 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109 (Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:23A-9 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023 (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1805 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
19-13-32 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2000); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.053(c),
154.073 (Vernon Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-8 (Supp. 2001); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 5.60.070(1)(e) (West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(a) (West 2000). In
some states, however, the statute allows courts to consider disclosures on a case-by-case basis.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.023(C)(4) (Anderson 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(e) (West 2000). Yet others
abrogate confidentiality whenever specific contract defenses are at issue. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1) (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (1997); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5949(b)(3) (West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.12 (Michie 2000), or even
more broadly, in any settlement enforcement proceedings, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 574(b)(6) (1994
& Supp. IV 1998) (Administrative Dispute Resolution Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
235d(b)(2) (1999); IOWA CODE § 679C.2(7) (West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(1)
(1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.222(4) (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(c)(v) (Michie 1999).
124. See, e.g., Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (releasing parties
from confidentiality requirements to evaluate claim of settlement invalidity); Vela v. Hope
Lumber & Supply Co., 966 P.2d 1196, 1197-98 & n.2 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998) (enforcing
mediated agreement after a hearing on claims of economic duress, coercion,
unconscionability and undue influence); Golden v. Hood, No. E1999-02443-COA-MR3-CV,
2000 WL 122195 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2000) (describing an affidavit detailing mediation
communications in support of duress claim); Lerer v. Lerer, No. 05-99-00474-CV, 2000 WL
567020 (Tex. Ct. App. May 3, 2000) (noting affidavits describing mediation communications
to support defense of insufficient mental capacity); Brinkerhoff v. Campbell, 994 P.2d 911,
916 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on statements made on day of
mediation to resolve claim of misrepresentation).
125. See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(weighing the need for mediator's testimony on duress against desirability of maintaining
mediation confidentiality); Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (considering
exception to statutory confidentiality when fraud alleged); Randle v. Mid-Gulf, Inc., No. 14-
95-01292, 1996 WL 447954 (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 1996) (concluding that the party who seeks to
enforce settlement cannot invoke confidentiality against defense of duress).
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mediation. It would not be long before such results could undermine
parties' confidence in mediation in general. Conversely, a rule that
implements the opposite approach and prevents all disclosures could
create a risk that parties will be coerced or tricked into agreements
without recourse. This would undermine a principle of mediation that is
even more fundamental than confidentiality-the autonomy of the
parties in reaching a mediated agreement. Mediation would no longer
be consensual if a strict confidentiality rule were to prevent parties from
challenging the validity of agreements they did not enter freely. Thus,
neither a bright line rule permitting disclosure nor an absolute rule
maintaining confidentiality is justified or workable.'26
By assigning courts the task of evaluating the need for exceptions in
felony proceedings and when defenses are raised to settlement
enforcement, the UMA admittedly is not providing parties with
maximum predictability. In my view, however, this shortcoming is
unavoidable. If the Act were to mandate disclosures in felony
proceedings and for settlement enforcement under all circumstances,
mediation confidentiality would be unnecessarily infringed in many
cases. If instead it did not permit these exceptions at all, the Act would
risk becoming an empty promise of confidentiality. In cases involving
state statutes that do not explicitly authorize disclosures in criminal
cases or for contract defenses, courts will proceed on their own to
impose an exception or to evaluate the need for an exception to
confidentiality. 27 In my view, it is preferable to give courts standards for
that evaluation. This will alert mediation parties to the possibility,
however distant, that they may face a disclosure, which in my view is
more preferable than leaving courts entirely without guidance and
overstating to the parties the prospect of confidentiality. Because of the
impossibility of resolving in advance the balance between permitting a
disclosure and maintaining confidentiality on these two topics, the
uncertainty associated with case-by-case judicial determinations must be
regarded as a necessary evil.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the UMA provides a balanced approach to issues of
maintaining confidentiality in mediation. Given that the adversary
setting makes these issues more complex than those that surround the
protection of confidential communications in most other contexts, this is
126. See generally Deason, supra note 49.
127. See cases cited supra in notes 111-112, 121-122.
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a significant achievement. The Act serves the triple purposes of
mediation confidentiality while at the same time avoiding an absolutist
approach that would not survive application by the courts.
The UMA's compromises and choices are necessary to advance
uniformity because of the overwhelming variety that now exists in
mediation confidentiality provisions. The same variety means that the
difficult policy decisions embodied in the UMA are bound to trigger
dissent. Many states with mediation statutes are likely to conclude that
some of the UMA provisions are at odds with their own policy choices.
That dissent, however, should be set aside in order to further the goal of
predictability, which is crucial to the overall effectiveness of mediation
confidentiality. Realistically, predictable mediation confidentiality is
beyond reach without uniform provisions. States therefore need to
avoid chauvinism and adopt the UMA, even if it means compromising
specific positions, in order to help foster an overall climate conducive to
mediation.
* * *
